Leander Schaerlaeckens

The league’s emphasis on youth development has seen its place in the careers of US national team players shift dramatically Sign up for the World Behind The Cup newsletter When the United States men’s national team traveled to France for the 1998 World Cup, they did so with 16 Major League Soccer players on their 22-man roster. This was very much by design. MLS had kicked off in 1996 as a fulfilled promise made to Fifa by US Soccer for the right to host the 1994 World Cup. The new league then set about hoarding as many national team players as it could. In a winless and mirthless tournament in 1998, fraught by a fractious camp, the Americans started an MLS player 21 times in their three group-stage matches, for an average of seven per starting lineup. That number has trended down ever since. In the 2002 run to the World Cup quarter-finals, setting the program’s modern high-water mark, an average of 5.4 MLS players made a start in the USA’s five matches. In 2006, it was 3.33. By 2010, that number had sunk to two; and in 2022, it was only one. In Qatar, the USMNT’s final group stage match against Iran was, in fact, the first time the team had started no MLS players at all at a World Cup since the league’s founding.

Expansion and political influence have made soccer’s showpiece too big for one region to handle responsibly Sign up for the World Behind The Cup newsletter In retrospect, the 2018 World Cup in Russia looks like a gentle genuflection, a dainty little bow before its strongman leader. Vladimir Putin and his Russian project of gradual conquest were most definitely centered and validated eight years ago: the tournament showcased his nation and awarded its leader prominence of place. This summer, we will see something altogether different, as the runup to this edition of the world’s biggest and most popular sporting event has become a monument to Donald Trump. This is an extract from Soccer with Jonathan Wilson, a weekly look from the Guardian US at the game in Europe and beyond, helmed this week by Leander in Jonathan’s absence. Subscribe for free here. Have a question for Jonathan? Email [email protected], and he’ll answer the best in a future edition. Leander Schaerlaeckens is a Guardian US contributor whose book on the United States men’s national soccer team, The Long Game, is out on 12 May. You can preorder it here. He teaches at Marist University.

For examples of how little a team’s form in the World Cup run-in matters in the tournament itself, look no further than the US The last time the United States men’s national team entered into the final stretch of their preparations for a World Cup on home soil, the results were dire. From January through April of 1994, the Americans, who were mostly sequestered in a full-time training camp, played 12 games and won just twice. They even managed to lose to Iceland, who were a total non-factor in global soccer back then. Then, that ’94 team went on to survive the group stage and narrowly lose to eventual champions Brazil, 1-0, in the round of 16. They delivered on expectations in spite of their deflating run-in.